Voter initiatives are a central part of the policy making process in many states. While much evidence shows that the initiative process affects policy choices, almost no evidence explains how the initiative process affects policy. One view is that initiatives change policy directly through voters approving laws that override the legislature; a different view, grounded in game theory, is that the initiative process changes policy indirectly by providing a threat that induces the legislature to change policy. This paper develops and implements an empirical strategy to quantify the direct and indirect effects of the initiative based on the idea that direct effects can be observed in states that actually pass initiatives while indirect effects can be observed in states where the initiative is available but not used. Evidence from 50 states on nine separate issues suggests that both direct and indirect effects are important, but the direct effect is several times more important than the threat effect. The evidence also suggests the importance of another indirect channel: when voters reject an initiative, legislatures move policy away from the outcome proposed by the initiative. 
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Introduction
Direct democracy continues to be a central feature of the political landscape in many American states, with voters having decided more than 1,400 statewide ballot propositions in the 21st century. In some states, such as California and Oregon, it is impossible to understand state policy and politics without taking into account the initiative process, and even in states with less frequent citizen lawmaking, individual ballot measures continue to emerge that have far-reaching impact. Many contentious issues in the states are being fought out through ballot propositions, such as same-sex marriage, drug legalization, campaign finance, redistricting, taxes, and government borrowing, and legislatures in initiative states act under the shadow of an ever-present threat of future initiatives from disgruntled groups and individuals.
The common observation that ballot propositions drive policy choices in initiative stats has been reinforced by a now substantial body of research that documents systematic policy differences between initiative and noninitiative states.
Initiative states have been shown to choose different policies than noninitiative states across a variety of issues, including taxes, spending, abortion, death penalty, term limits, and others.
1 Related research suggests that initiative states tend to choose policies that are more congruent with public opinion than noninitiative states (Matsusaka, 2005 (Matsusaka, , 2010 . For example, Figure 1 shows the percentage of states whose policy choices are congruent with majority opinion across nine separate issues, distinguishing initiative from noninitiative states (using data that will be described in more detail later in the paper). Initiative states are more likely than noninitiative states to choose the policy favored by the majority; the difference is small when public opinion is divided on an issue, but becomes enormous when public opinion is one-sided.
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While evidence that initiative states choose different policies than noninitiative states is abundant, exactly how those differences arise remains something of a mystery.
Some high profile initiatives have been approved by voters, but many of the policy outcomes underlying the differences in Figure 1 cannot be traced to measures that appeared on the ballot; apparently they resulted from decisions by legislators. The literature has suggested two broad channels through which the initiative process can influence policy. The direct channel is the most obvious, by creation of new laws through propositions approved by the voters. The indirect channel works not by approval of ballot propositions, but by causing the legislature to adopt different policies than it would have adopted if the initiative process was unavailable. An indirect effect can appear if the legislature chooses different policies when initiatives are available in order to deter the threat of being overridden (Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001) or in response to new information that is revealed by election returns, which can happen even with an unsuccessful measure (Gerber, 1999; Matsusaka, 2004, Ch. 9 ).
There is some anecdotal evidence that legislatures respond to initiative threats (Key and Crouch, 1938; Gerber, 1998) and that legislatures care about even unsuccessful measures (Gerber, 1999) , but there is no quantitative or statistical evidence on the relative importance of the different channels of influence. Until we are able to identify and quantify the actual channels through which the initiative process works, our understanding of the process will remain somewhat shallow.
This purpose of this paper is to take some initial steps toward quantitatively disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative, that is, to identify the mechanisms that create the gaps between initiative and noninitiative states in Figure 1 .
The standard research design in this literature is to compare policies in initiative and noninitiative states, typically using state-level cross-sectional or panel data. With sufficient controls for the other determinants of policy, the noninitiative states serve as a control group, and remaining differences between initiative and noninitiative states can be attributed to the presence of the initiative process. Typically, this boils down to introducing an initiative dummy variable (or index) into a regression; the coefficient on the initiative dummy reveals whether or not the initiative matters, but does not separate the initiative effect into direct and indirect channels.
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One contribution of this study is to show how the initiative effect can be decomposed into pieces that represent direct and indirect effects so that the separate channels of influence can be isolated. Intuitively, the direct effect of the initiative on a particular issue can be identified from the policy choices of states in which an initiative was approved by the voters, while the indirect effect can be identified from the policy choices of states where the initiative process was available but an initiative was not approved, in both cases using the policies of noninitiative states as the control group.
The indirect effect can be further parsed by distinguishing states in which a measure appeared on the ballot but was rejected (a communication or signaling effect) versus states in which no initiative appeared on the ballot at all (pure threat effect). There is a straightforward empirical specification that captures the different channels
The substantive contribution of this study is provision of evidence that deepens our understanding of three channels of influence discussed in the literature. Based on data describing policy choices in all 50 states on nine different issues, and controlling for public opinion, demographics, and other variables, I find that the initiative influences policy through both the direct and indirect channels, but the direct channel is much more important. In terms of congruence, initiative states are 16 percent more likely than noninitiative states to choose a policy congruent with public opinion, but the difference is 35 percent when initiatives are actually approved (direct effect) compared to 9 percent when the initiative is only a threat (indirect effect). (McCarty, 2000) . In terms of theory, the findings provide support for game theoretic models of the initiative process such as Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) that predict the initiative influences policy indirectly by providing a threat. The evidence lends support to a central message of these models that it is important to consider the strategic responses of political actors to institutional opportunities. Finally, the evidence highlights the importance for empirical research of considering both direct and indirect effects of the initiative.
Gerber (1998, p. 192) speculates, "Studies that focus solely on direct influence [ballot propositions that are actually passed] are likely to seriously underestimate the influence of groups that use initiatives to achieve indirect influence." The findings confirm of the importance of considering both direct and indirect effects, and by quantifying the direct and indirect effects, suggest that the amount of underestimation can be large if the indirect effects are ignored.
Channels of Influence
This section reviews existing theories on direct and indirect effects, and discusses approaches to testing them.
Direct Effect: Override
The direct channel -voter approval of new laws proposed by citizen petition -is the most obvious way that the initiative process can influence policy. The potential impact of this channel depends on the degree to which legislatures respond to public opinion: if elected officials consistently and accurately represent their constituents, there would be little scope for initiatives to override their decisions.
Many reasons have been offered why legislatures might choose policies incongruent with public opinion. The Progressives who agitated for the initiative process at the turn of the nineteenth century focused on the influence of special interests on the legislature:
"If we felt that we had genuine representative government in our state legislatures no one would propose the initiative and referendum in America. They are being proposed now as a means of bringing our representatives back to the consciousness that what they are bound in duty and in mere policy to do is to represent the sovereign people who they profess to serve and not the private interests which creep into their counsels by way of machine orders and committee conferences." (Woodrow Wilson, 1912, pp. 87-88) A recurrent theme of much political science research is the existence of barriers to citizen control of public policy, such as limited information of voters and representatives (Campbell, et al., 1960; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Groseclose and McCarty, 2000) , interest groups (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) , and legislative structure (Weingast et al., 1981; Cox and McCubbins, 2005 
Indirect Effect: Threat
The indirect threat effect of the initiative is a central feature of game theoretic models (Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001) . 4 In these models, the legislature has a policy preference that may not coincide with the median voter's preference. If an interest group dislikes the current policy, a forward-looking legislature may accommodate the group by moving the policy closer to the group's preference in order to deter the group from placing a measure on the ballot. As a result, the policy choice may end up being different due to availability of the initiative even though a proposition does not appear on the ballot. With complete information, the policy changes brought about by the threat can only help the median voter because only a threat to move toward the median voter is credible enough to engender a legislative response.
However, with incomplete information about voter preferences or policy consequences, legislatures may accommodate an extreme interest group by moving policy away from the median voter (Gerber and Lupia, 1995; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001 ).
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Existing evidence on the indirect threat effective is largely anecdotal. Gerber (1998) discusses specific cases where initiative threats appeared to prompt policy changes by the legislature, and other isolated examples can be found in popular accounts. Randolph (2010) documents that legislatures enact more bills in initiative states than noninitiative states, which he interprets as an indication of greater deterrence activity. Assessing the importance of the threat effect is particularly important because game theoretic models suggest that the threat effect is the primary channel through which the initiative influences policy. Indeed, in models with complete information, the initiative influences policy only by providing a threat -initiatives never actually reach the ballot because a forward-looking legislature sufficiently accommodates groups with credible initiative threats to deter actual propositions. The indirect threat effect can be inferred by comparing policies of initiative states in which no initiatives were actually approved with the policies of noninitiative states.
Indirect Effect: Communication
Another channel of influence, less prominent than the override and threat channels, is the idea that votes on an initiative communicates information about citizen preferences to elected officials, who learn from the election returns and adjust policy accordingly.
This "communication" (or sometimes "signaling") channel is premised on the idea that elected representatives would like to follow public opinion, at least to some degree, but may not have enough information about the citizen preferences to be certain what their constituents want. 5 The idea that representatives may make "honest mistakes" that can be corrected by ballot propositions is explored in Gerber (1998 ), and Matsusaka (1992 , 2004 . Communication between voters and legislators is presumably the rationale for nonbinding advisory votes that are held in many cities and some states.
The communication channel has been recognized for some time. Key and Crouch (1938, p. 457) 
Other Indirect Effects
Indirect effects other than threat and communication have been postulated, or can be inferred from existing research. Several studies have emphasized the so-called educative effects of initiatives: initiative campaigns may cause citizens to become more informed about and active in politics (for example, Smith and Tolbert (2004) ). A more informed electorate may put pressure on legislators to respect constituent views, leading to policies that are more congruent with public opinion. Another view is that availability of the initiative process creates greater incentives for interest groups to form and mobilize ( Boehmke (2005) , Boehmke and Bowen (2010)) . A larger population of interest groups could influence legislators through lobbying, campaign contributions, and so on, leading to different policies than if the groups were absent. Although this paper does not attempt to construct tests directly targeted at these channels, to the extent that the evidence is consistent with the idea of indirect channels of influence, it lends some support to the existence of these other channels.
Empirical Strategy
Methods
The analysis focuses on a set of = 1, … ,9 policies in = 1, … ,50 states using a logistic regression framework of the form
where is a dichotomous policy outcome equal to 0 or 1, is vector-valued variable capturing initiative channels of influence, is a vector of control variables, is an error term, and , , and are parameters to be estimated. 6 In much of the existing literature, is specified as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a state allows the initiative and 0 otherwise. 7 With such a specification, the coefficient on the dummy variable absorbs all of the different initiative effects, and provides a summary indicator of the overall effect of the initiative.
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In order to disentangle the different channels of influence, multiple dummy variables are introduced. The simplest specification distinguishes direct from indirect effects by using two dummy variables:
6 The paper reports results from linear probability models (1), but every regression was also estimated with a logistic specification, which is theoretically more appropriate given the dichotomous dependent variable. I have chosen to report coefficients from the linear specification because they have a direct interpretation as marginal probabilities, and in no case does the linear specification produce a finding that is different in a material way from the logistic specification.
(2) = 0 + 1 , where = 1 if the initiative was available in state , and zero otherwise;
= 1 if an initiative about issue was approved in state , and zero otherwise;
Since initiative availability is captured with , the direct effect of the initiative is given by 1 and the indirect effect is then given by 0 . The "full effect" in a state where voters approved an initiative is captured by 0 + 1 because both channels of influence are at work. The questions of interest are first, whether 0 and 1 are different from zero (that is, whether either effect matters in practice), and second, how the two coefficients compare to each other in magnitude.
The indirect channel can be further disentangled between threat and communication components by introducing a third dummy variable:
where = 1 if an initiative on issue appeared on the ballot in state but was not approved, and zero otherwise.
In this case, the direct effect associated with approval of an initiative continues to be captured by 1 . The indirect effect from communication (associated with an unsuccessful measure) is captured by 2 and the indirect threat effect is captured by 0 . 9 Note that and are not mutually exclusive; a state could have had both a successful and unsuccessful initiative on a particular issue.
Data
The investigation focuses on nine public issues across the 50 states as of 2006, giving a total of 450 observations in most estimates. The issues were selected based on availability of opinion data in the American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES treated each policy as having a dichotomous outcome (for example, allowing or prohibiting the death penalty), meaning there is a well-defined majority position on each issue, which is necessary to implement the congruence measure. Descriptive and summary information on the nine issues are reported in Table 1 .
An important control variable in regression (1) Thus, = 1 means that state has adopted the majority position (which is also the median position) on issue , while = 0 means the state has adopted the minority's choice. The initiative variables in (2) and (3) then reveal how the different channels of influence affect the congruence of policy and opinion.
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The other approach to model (1) utilizes the actual policy choice as the dependent variable. In order to consider different policies in the same regression, the outcomes must be expressed in a common metric. I use the ideological orientation of the policy, that is, is defined as:
= � 1 if state chooses the conservative outcome on issue ; 0 otherwise.
Most of the policies studied in this paper have a natural ideological orientation, for example, support for the death penalty is the "conservative" position and opposition is the "liberal" position. To provide a more systematic classification, I regressed the percentage of citizens in a state that favor a given outcome on the state ideology index developed by Erikson et al. (1993) index. For seven issues, conservative states were more likely to express what would normally be considered the conservative opinion. For two issues, English as the official language and estate tax, there was no significant correlation between state ideology and positions for or against the policy. Given the lack of evidence on whether support or opposition is the conservative position on these two issues, there was no credible way to classify outcomes for those issues, and they are not considered in the outcome regressions. For the remaining issues, "conservative" outcomes are defined as opposition to "partial-birth" abortion, opposition to public funding of abortion, opposition to anti-discrimination laws based on sexual orientation, 10 There is a large literature concerned with estimating policy congruence and policy responsiveness. The present paper does not attempt to break new ground on the core research design questions in that literature but rather uses "off the shelf" variables that were developed previously. The measure in (4) is essentially the concept stated in Gerber (1999) as implemented in Matsusaka (2010) . Erikson et al. (1993) provides a good discussion of the issues, and Matsusaka (2010) Each column of Table 3 reports a linear regression of model (1) in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for congruent outcomes (as defined in (4)).
Empirical Results
Column ( The regressions include control variables that for the most part are standard in the literature. The most important variable in terms of explanatory power is the size of the majority; for each percentage point increase in the majority, the probability of a congruent outcome increases by 2.1 percent, according to the point estimate. One possible explanation for this pattern is that a large majority offers more votes to meet supermajority requirements that support executive vetoes, constitutional amendments, and other legislative procedures that empower a minority. Another possible explanation is that states with heterogeneous opinion (a small majority) are more difficult to represent because the majority view is more difficult to identify, leading to more "honest mistakes" by politicians when setting policy (Matsusaka and McCarty 2001 Finally, this regression and all others throughout the paper include separate dummy variables for each issue, but I do not report those coefficients.
Column (A) establishes that initiative states are more congruent than noninitiative states, holding constant the control variables. The main task of the paper is to shed some light on the reason for that difference. Column (B) reports a regression that separates direct and indirect effects using the approach in equation (2), one dummy variable for initiative availability and one dummy variable for states in which voters actually approved an initiative on the issue in question. Both initiative coefficients are positive and different from zero at the 10 percent level of statistical significance or better, suggesting that both direct and indirect effects are important, but the coefficient for the direct effect is more than three times the magnitude of the coefficient for the indirect effect. The estimates imply that having the initiative process available increases the probability of congruence by 9 percent, and when voters actually approve an initiative, the probability of congruence increases by 26 percent. Although the coefficient for the direct effect is larger than the coefficient for the indirect effect, the difference is not quite statistically significant ( = 0.12).
Column (C) reports a regression that allows for a separate indirect "communication" effect by including a dummy variable for states that had an initiative on the ballot that failed, as described in (3). This variable allows for the possibility that explored alternative specifications, such as log of income instead of its level, and allowed the initiative effects to interact with the opinion variables.
the election returns from a ballot measure, even if unsuccessful, might influence the legislature's behavior. The estimates provide little evidence of an indirect channel along these lines. The coefficient of the dummy for failed initiatives is quantitatively small and far from statistically significant. The other two initiative coefficients are essentially unchanged. Taken at face value, these estimates imply that the initiative influences congruence by providing a threat, but placing a measure on the ballot that is unsuccessful does not increase (or reduce) the effectiveness of the threat. One caveat is that there are not many observations that fit into the indirect communication category
(only 5 percent of the total), so it might be difficult to detect a communication effect if it does exist (although an effect does appear in Table 4 ). The fact that there are so few cases in this category itself suggests that this channel of influence is of secondary importance for the issues studied here.
The specification in (C) treats all failed initiatives as the same. However, an initiative that fails by a small margin might convey different information than an initiative that fails by a large margin. To allow for this possibility, the regression in The last two regressions investigate robustness of the results. As discussed above, some of the issue-specific opinion data had to be imputed for some states because of small sample sizes in the ANES. There is no reason to expect a bias in the resulting congruence measures, but they could be noisy. Column (E) reports a regression with the same specification as column (C) except that observations with imputed public opinion are excluded. The results remain substantively the same. A related concern, also mentioned above, is that congruence is most susceptible to mismeasurement when public opinion is evenly divided. There is no reason to expect this to create a bias, but it may introduce noise. Column (F) reports a regression with same specification as (C) except that observations where the majority was less than 60 percent are excluded.
Again, the results remain substantively the same.
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I also explored but do not report estimates that distinguish between legal rules for the initiative process in different states. Each state implements its initiative process in a different way, and those variations in implementation may influence congruence.
To examine this, I allowed the initiative effect to vary with the signature requirement for placing a measure on the ballot, and whether the state allows initiatives to amend the 
Conservative versus Liberal Outcomes
The preceding section explores how the initiative affects the congruence between policy and public opinion. This section explores how the initiative affects the 17 Another robustness concern is whether any one particular issue out of the nine is driving the results.
Based on regressions that delete issues one by one, it can be determined that the term limits issue contributes more to the results than any other single issue. If observations concerning term limits are deleted from the sample, the regression continues to show an overall initiative effect, and a positive direct effect, but the coefficient on the direct effect is not different from zero at conventional levels of significance. The lack of significance could be due to having many fewer observations that use the direct channel once the term limits observations are removed. A reasonable conclusion is that the sample displays evidence for the direct channel, but largely on the issue of term limits.
ideological direction of policy choices. Since the policy is dichotomous, this boils down to explaining whether the outcome is "conservative" or "liberal." There is no a priori reason to believe that the initiative process would push policy in one direction or the other on average. However, empirical studies on direct democracy routinely find that initiative and noninitiative states choose systematically different policies, even though their ideological orientations are not different. 18 It is therefore interesting to examine whether initiative and noninitiative states choose different policies for the issues studied in this paper, and if so, which channel of influence can best account for the different policies. Table 3 , it is worth noting that there is no mechanical connection between the dependent variables (congruence versus conservative policy choice) in the two tables. One could imagine data patterns in which the initiative increases congruence but reduces the likelihood of a conservative policy.
Taken together, the column (A) regressions in Tables 3 and 4 imply that initiative states have more congruent policies than noninitiative states, and this happens because they choose more conservative policies; or put differently, the noninitiative states have less congruent outcomes because their policy choices are too liberal compared to majority opinion in the state. Public opinion is an important explanatory variable: a one percentage point increase in support for the conservative outcome is associated with a 1.8 percent higher probability of a conservative outcome being chosen. Income is also highly significant, with wealthy states more likely to choose liberal outcomes. The coefficient on the new variable has the expected sign -a 1 percent increase in votes supporting an unsuccessful conservative initiative increases the probability of a conservative law by 0.3 percent -but it cannot be distinguished from zero at conventional levels of significance. This could mean that the votes received by an unsuccessful initiative do not matter, but more likely is that there are too few observations to generate precise estimates.
The regressions in columns (E) and (F) explore the robustness of the findings to alternative measures of public opinion. In these regressions, the ANES-based issuespecific measures of public opinion are replaced by general ideology measures. Column (E) uses the state ideology index of Erikson et al. (1993) and column (F) uses the "citizen ideology" measure of Berry et al. (1998) . Both ideology measures have a good ability to explain policy choice, but neither variable changes the substantive findings with respect to the initiative variables.
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The findings on policy choice can be summarized as follows. Initiative states are 16 percent more likely to choose a conservative policy than noninitiative states, and this makes policy more congruent with public opinion in initiative than noninitiative states.
The initiative has both indirect and direct effects on the policy choice, but the direct effect stemming from approval of a measure is more important than the indirect threat effect. And finally, failed initiatives do seem to have an indirect effect on policy choices, but in the opposite direction than is sometimes believed: when voters reject a conservative initiative, the state is less likely to adopt a conservative policy than if the initiative process was not available.
Implications
A healthy scholarly literature has found that the initiative process changes outcomes across a number of different policy issues, and several studies find that the initiative makes laws more congruent with public opinion, and tilts them in a conservative direction. 20 However, little is known about how the initiative brings about policy changes, even though several theoretical channels of influence have been suggested and often discussed. This paper develops an empirical strategy to measure the impact of three potential channels that have been emphasized in the literature: an indirect "threat" channel, an indirect "communication" channel, and a direct channel.
The strategy is to compare policy choices in states that use only the direct channel (that is, actually approve an initiative), states that use the indirect channels (where the initiative is available but an actual measure is not approved), and states that do not permit initiatives at all. The study examines policy outcomes on nine high profile policy issues across all 50 states.
A central finding is that the direct effect is most important, quantitatively and statistically. In all specifications, states that actually pass initiatives on specific issues choose policies that are more congruent with public opinion and more conservative than states where the initiative is available but not used or states where the initiative is unavailable. The point estimates suggest that having a successful initiative on the ballot increases the probability of congruence by 26 percent compared to simply having the initiative process available, and increases the probability of a conservative policy choice by 33 percent. The large direct effect of the initiative suggests that the ability of groups to undermine an approved ballot measure after the election (for example, through court challenge or legislative repeal) is limited, at least for the issues studied here.
There is also evidence that the initiative affects policy indirectly by providing a threat, as suggested by game theoretic models. States that have the initiative process available but do not have any measures on the ballot are 9 percent more likely to choose a congruent policy than noninitiative states, and are 10 percent more likely to choose a conservative policy. There is also some evidence, albeit weaker, of a communication or signaling effect from unsuccessful initiatives, but the estimates are somewhat noisy due to the relatively small number of observations in this category.
Unsuccessful initiatives do not have a distinguishable effect on congruence, but failure of a conservative initiative makes a state more likely to adopt a liberal policy outcome, and vice versa. Contrary to the view that interest groups may be able to help themselves by sponsoring a measure even if it fails, the evidence suggests that they would be better off keeping their cards hidden than playing and revealing a losing hand.
These findings confirm one of the central insights of game theoretic models of the initiative process, that the process can influence policy by providing a threat without an actual measure on the ballot (Gerber, 1996; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001 ).
However, the evidence implies that the threat effect is of secondary importance compared to the direct effect. Perfect information models in which the initiative matters only through the threat effect appear to be missing most of the story. This suggests that more research would be useful on incomplete information models, and more generally, models in which the initiative matters directly by overriding the legislature rather than through threats. Gerber (1998) offers some thoughts on why indirect effects may be difficult for groups to exploit, and further research along these lines would seem to be in order.
The evidence also offers ideas for future empirical research. The finding that indirect channels are important for policy choices implies that empirical studies focusing only on the direct channel will miss an important part of the story. Studies that examine only initiatives that reach the ballot or only initiatives that are approved will not capture the threat effect. To determine the full effect of the initiative, empirical studies need to employ an approach that can capture both direct and direct effects. The paper offers a strategy for separating the direct and indirect channels of initiative influence, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to disentangle the different channels of influence in this way. The finding that more than one channel is important suggests it might be worthwhile to further refine the approach. The empirical strategy may also be useful in studying other political institutions that are likely to have both direct and indirect effects, such as the executive veto.
It seems appropriate to end with caveats. The study focuses on nine issues that were the subject of questions in the ANES. Most of these are social issues, and in some cases are included because they are emerging issues. The influence of the initiative on such issues may be different than its influence on more perennial issues such as taxes and spending. The study also focuses on policies that prevail at a particular point in time. As other research has shown, the effect of the initiative may vary over time, both in magnitude and direction. While the evidence here represents a first step in disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative, some caution is in order before generalizing beyond these issues and this point in time.
Opinion data were drawn from three sources. The "state ideology index" (=percent liberal minus percent conservative) came from Erikson et al. (1993) . "Citizen ideology" and "government ideology"
came from Berry et al. (1998) Jones and Norrander (1995) report evidence suggesting that the ANES can be aggregated reliably at the state level with large enough sample sizes, but even so, these estimates of citizen preferences may contain significant noise and possibly bias. Brace et al. (2007) argue that the main concern with this type of pooling measure is reliability, the failure to detect real relationships. Thus, there is an argument that the data limitations create a bias against finding a significant result. See the contributions to the Summer 2007 issue of State Politics and Policy Quarterly for discussion of the pros and cons of different measures.
As discussed in the text, I have estimated my results using a variety of alternative measures to ensure that they are not dependent on one particular formulation.
An important feature of the paper's measure of congruence is that it is robust to potentially large amounts of measurement error. This is because when calculating congruence, the size of the majority does not matter: congruence is the same if a state's opinion is 55 percent or 95 percent in favor of a policy. Errors in measuring opinion do not affect congruence unless the error is great enough to cause the majority to flip from one side of the issue to the other. For the policies studied, opinion is usually lopsided Death penalty "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" 78.0 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004 65.4 1990, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004 6 2 Same-sex marriage "Should same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or do you think they should not be allowed to marry?" Responses: 1=Allowed. 5= Not allowed. 7=Not allowed to marry, but civil unions allowed. ("In favor" = response 1)
2004 11 10
Term limits? "A law has been proposed that would limit members of Congress to no more than 12 consecutive years of service in that office. Do you favor or oppose such a law ?" 78.3 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998 21 19
Note. "Question" is the question asked in the American National Election Studies survey. "Year" is the study year, except that 1988 refers to the 1988-1992 ANES Pooled Senate File. Statistics for "% in favor" were computed with the state as the unit of observation. A successful initiative was one approved by the voters or an indirect initiative approved by legislature. Note. Each column report estimates from a linear regression to explain the probability of a congruent outcome, defined as a policy outcome supported by a majority of citizens. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. The regressions cover nine issues across 50 states, except where noted. Coefficients on income are multiplied by 100 for readability. Significance levels are indicated: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%. Note. Each column report estimates from a linear regression to explain the probability of a conservative (versus liberal) policy choice. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. The regressions cover seven issues (excluding English-only and estate tax) across 50 states. Coefficients on income are multiplied by 100 for readability. Significance levels are indicated: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%.
